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“NONCONVENTIONAL” MUSICAL ANALYSIS AND 
“DISGUISED” INFRINGEMENT: CLEVER MUSICAL TRICKS TO 
DIVIDE THE WEALTH OF TIN PAN ALLEY 
MARK AVSEC1 
“And I should myself hesitate to utter so clear an invitation to exploitation 
of slight musical analogies by clever musical tricks in the hope of getting 
juries hereafter in this circuit to divide the wealth of Tin Pan Alley. This 
holding seems to me an invitation to the strike suit par excellence.” -- 
Judge Clark, dissenting in Arnstein v. Porter. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
While it is certainly false that only professional composers are capable of writing 
quality music, the likelihood for frivolous claims in musical plagiarism cases is much 
higher when nonprofessionals are plaintiffs. 
[W]hat we’re talking about is dreams.  They’ve always dreamed they 
would make it big . . . and it’s just hard for them to believe that 30 or 50 
or 100 other people had the same idea. And once they’ve filed their 
lawsuit, they are true believers.  They’ve told their friends and relatives 
that this [work] was stolen from their material, and it is very difficult for 
them to accept defeat.2 
A reasonable theory of access, a copyrighted song, and a contingency-fee lawyer 
is all a plaintiff has practically needed to get into court.  The issue of whether or not 
disputed songs are musically similar, that other all-important prong necessary to 
establish copying in fact, has rarely been decided by judges before a defendant’s 
expenses of litigation have begun to mount because judges, not musically proficient 
themselves, are typically faced with conflicting affidavits submitted by paid music 
experts.  If one is willing to pay someone to testify, one is going to be able to find 
someone someplace who has a few credentials to his or her name and is willing to 
testify to anything for the right price.  The result is that, contrary to what Judge 
Frank promised us in Arnstein v. Porter,3 the device of summary judgment may not 
serve the purpose for which it was designed in the musical copyright infringement 
lawsuit, i.e., the disposition of needless litigation.4  If songs at issue are not factually 
similar, cases ought to be dismissed as a matter of law.  Judge Frank’s ruling in 
Arnstein depended on the belief that judges throw out cases in which the absence of 
similarities is obvious.5  The subject of this article concerns what happens when 
plaintiffs’ contingency-fee lawyers and the musicologists they hire attempt to 
“manufacture” similarities, though, by “clever musical tricks” in order to create 
factual disputes even in patent cases6 in an effort to fool judges and defeat 
meritorious motions for summary judgment. 
In the early 1940s, Ira Arnstein was an amateur songwriter and career litigant 
who filed a complaint alleging that noted tunesmith, Cole Porter, had stolen several 
of his compositions.7  Although Mr. Arnstein’s theories of how Cole Porter might 
                                                                
2Maureen Baker, Note, La[w]-- A Note To Follow So:  Have We Forgotten the Federal 
Rules of Evidence in Music Plagiarism Cases?, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1583, n.6 (1992) (citation 
omitted) (quoting Louis Petrich). 
3154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946). 
4Summary judgment is a procedural device available for prompt and expeditious 
disposition of controversy without trial when there is no dispute as to either material fact or 
inferences to be drawn from undisputed facts, or if only question of law is involved.  BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY 1001 (Abridged 6th ed. 1991). 
5See infra text accompanying notes 6 - 11. 
6These are the cases upon which Judge Frank’s decision depends where summary 
judgment will be granted without question.  See infra text accompanying notes 10 - 11. 
7See infra note 33. 
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have had access to his works were fanciful and farfetched, Judge Frank prudently 
acknowledged that “sometimes truth is stranger than fiction” and would not grant 
Cole Porter summary judgment solely on the basis that Arnstein’s theories of access 
were tenuous.8  The court felt obliged to give Mr. Arnstein the benefit of the doubt 
and inquire whether there was further evidence of copying, i.e., were there sufficient 
musical similarities between the disputed songs so as to warrant a trial?  Judge Frank 
opined that there were and dismissed Porter’s motion for summary judgment.9 
Did Judge Frank’s opinion in Arnstein v. Porter give carte blanche to potential 
musical terrorists?  After all, many plaintiffs armed with tenuous theories of access 
and hungry professors of music may only yearn to accomplish what Ira Arnstein did, 
i.e., defeat motions for summary judgment.  It is axiomatic that if it will cost an 
innocent defendant $100 to litigate, the rational person may be tempted to settle for 
$99. Judge Clark, dissenting, was afraid that the opinion, then, would open up 
floodgates of vexatious litigation.10  Judge Frank, however, did not believe it.  
Arnstein v. Porter would not unfairly invite amateur songwriters and their 
contingency-fee lawyers to extort huge settlements from reputable composers, 
publishing companies, and record labels via strike suits because, as he pointed out in 
a now famous dictum, there existed the “patent” case.11  There would be no deluge of 
spurious litigation in the area of musical copyright infringement so long as there was 
a “dike” to protect innocent defendants from the deluge.  This dike, built of solid, 
objective analytical techniques and old-fashioned common sense, works to 
summarily dispose of the most frivolous suits because in the most obvious cases the 
absence of musical similarities between two pieces of music are so patent that even 
judges recognize them. 
We should not be taken as saying that a plagiarism case can never arise in 
which absence of similarities is so patent that a summary judgment for 
defendant would be correct.  Thus suppose that Ravel’s “Bolero” or 
Shostakovitch’s “Fifth Symphony” were alleged to infringe “When Irish 
Eyes Are Smiling.”  But this is not such a case.12 
In recent years there has emerged, however, a breach in the “dike,” a disease 
which has fatally undermined Judge Frank’s prudent qualification in Arnstein.  This 
disease is called “disguised” infringement, the specious result of a highly doubtful 
belief, i.e., that actionable infringement is being committed by composers who are 
actually abusing traditional methods of composition. 
                                                                
8Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 469.  See also infra note 34. 
9Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 475.  See also infra note 24. 
10And I should myself hesitate to utter so clear an invitation to exploitation of slight 
musical analogies by clever musical tricks in the hope of getting juries hereafter in this 
circuit to divide the wealth of Tin Pan Alley.  This holding seems to me an invitation 
to the strike suit par excellence. 
Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 479.  (Clark, J., dissenting). 
11Id. at 473. 
12Id. 
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Because of the current frenzy of music copyright litigation, purposeful 
infringers have become very sophisticated in devising compositional 
methods to disguise copying.  For example, composers of commercial 
music often receive assignments to emulate a particular popular song, but 
to avoid risking a lawsuit.  There are various techniques used to fulfill 
such an assignment.13 
“Disguised” infringement is invisible and cannot be diagnosed by conventional 
expert analysis; it requires instead, according to its proponents, special, 
“nonconventional” methods in order to detect it. 
With the music industry struggling to find outlets to expose new material in the 
post-Napster era, established record labels, producers, writers, and artists have 
recently begun to directly get involved in the advertising business by actually 
creating original musical compositions for advertisements.  This has prompted such 
partnerships as independent label Artemis Records’ joint venture with commercial 
production facility JSM Music and the formation of Soundproof, a new company 
created by veteran artist manager Irving Azoff, music manager Jordan Bratman, and 
marketing executive Noah Kerner, to offer original music for commercials created 
by top record producers.14  However, as art begins to more directly intersect with 
Madison Avenue, there will also likely be a significant increase in “disguised” 
infringement claims.  This is because composers, artists, and producers will 
inevitably receive instructions from their advertising agency clients, or from the 
brands themselves, to “safely” emulate a particular sound or popular song.  Given the 
chance, “nonconventional” musicologists would likely point to various “disguised” 
infringement techniques used to fulfill such an assignment.15 
This article argues that “disguised” infringement is oxymoronic and demagogic, 
and that the “nonconventional” musical analytical techniques employed to diagnose 
it are misguided.  If an expert cannot tell that two pieces of music are similar by 
traditional methods, that is probably because they are not similar.  The theory of 
“disguised” infringement effectually destroys the distinction between plagiarism and 
composition because the “nontraditional” techniques when employed to detect 
plagiarism potentially implicate every composition as an infringing work.  
Consequently, “disguised” infringement is a breach in Arnstein’s “dike,” for as I will 
show in Part IV of this article, even Judge Frank’s famous patent case is allowed to 
slip through, i.e., Ravel’s “Bolero” will be seen to have infringed “When Irish Eyes 
Are Smiling” when analyzed under the lens of “disguised” infringement.16  A 
summons and complaint take only one person convincing one lawyer to go forward.  
The paucity of musical copyright infringement cases disposed of by summary 
judgment already encourages litigation in the area.  Employing specious analytical 
methods will only exacerbate this problem. 
                                                                
13Judith Greenberg Finell, A Musicologist Discusses Disguised Infringement, N.Y. LAW 
JOURNAL, 5 (May 29, 1992), available at http://www.jfmusicservices.com/nyljarticle92 
part3.html. 
14See Melinda Newman, Azoff’s Brand-New Sound, BILLBOARD, May 29, 2004, at 9. 
15Finell, supra note 13, at 5. 
16See discussion infra part IV.C. 
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Part II of this article chronicles the role of the musical expert as it has been 
carved out over time.  Part III exposes the expert’s traditional methods for comparing 
musical compositions.  Part IV explores nonconventional analytical techniques, 
explains why they are misapplied when employed to detect “disguised” plagiarism 
and illustrates why Judge Frank would certainly retract his opinion if he heard of 
such sophistry.  Part V therefore concludes that lending authenticity to 
“nonconventional” analytical methods and “disguised” infringement claims would 
make professional songwriters more vulnerable than they already are.17 
II.  CARVING OUT THE ROLE OF THE MUSICAL EXPERT 
IN COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT SUITS 
A.  Elements of a Copyright Infringement Suit 
There are three basic elements that a plaintiff is required to establish in a musical 
copyright infringement suit.18  First of all, the plaintiff must establish a valid 
copyright.19  Secondly, there must have actually been copying.20  Thirdly, there must 
have been impermissible or unlawful copying, i.e., there must be a substantial degree 
of similarity between the disputed compositions.21  
The last two criteria, copying and impermissible copying, have been the source 
of some confusion. If the defendant did not copy, all of the similarity in the world, 
even to the point of identity, would not matter.22  Plaintiff, therefore, must first prove 
                                                                
17[T]hese suits are very common.  Typically, an unknown plaintiff sues a successful 
artist for a large sum.  Increasingly, the stakes are in the millions of dollars.  Music’s 
intangible nature, coupled with the potential for a high judgment or settlement value 
has served to make songwriters especially vulnerable to accusations of stealing 
another’s work.  And, “more often than not, somebody is ready to believe the accuser 
– or afraid somebody else will.” 
Baker, supra note 2, at 1584 (footnotes omitted). 
18See WILLIAM F. PATRY, LATMAN’S THE COPYRIGHT LAW 191 (6th ed. 1986) [hereinafter 
LATMAN]; Lone Wolfe McQuade Assocs. v. CBS, Inc., 961 F. Supp. 587, 592 (S.D.N.Y. 
1997) (citing Fisher-Price, Inc. v. Well-Made Toy Mfg. Corp., 25 F.3d 119, 122-23 (2d Cir. 
1994)).  
19See 17 U.S.C. § 410(c) (2001) (if a certification of registration is made before or within 
five years of first publication of the work, the copyright is valid). 
20See Arnstein v. Edward B. Marks Music Corp., 82 F.2d 275 (2d Cir. 1936), motion to set 
aside decree denied, 86 F.2d 715 (2d Cir. 1936) (proof of copying is essential to a claim of 
copyright infringement; no matter how similar the disputed works are, if defendant did not 
copy plaintiff’s work, there is no infringement). 
21See Laureyssens v. Idea Group, Inc., 964 F.2d 131, 139-40 (2d Cir. 1992) (“[A] plaintiff 
must first show that his work was actually copied . . . . The plaintiff then must show that the 
copying amounts to an ‘improper’ or ‘unlawful’ appropriation.”); see also Jeffrey G. Sherman, 
Note, Musical Copyright Infringement: The Requirement of Substantial Similarity, 22 
COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 81-82, 92 (1977). 
22Thus, two programmers who independently create the same software are both entitled to 
copyright.  RAYMOND T. NIMMER, THE LAW OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY ¶ 1.06, at 1-42 (1985) 
(“Copyright protection does not preclude independent creation of even identical works.”).  But 
see Bright Tunes Music Corp. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 420 F. Supp. 177, 180-81 (S.D.N.Y. 
1976) (holding that one can even be guilty of copying subconsciously; in this case, it was 
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there was copying.  Because as a practical matter it is usually not possible to prove 
directly that defendant(s) copied plaintiff’s work, circumstantial evidence is 
permitted to establish it.23  In the musical copyright infringement suit, typically the 
plaintiff first establishes that the alleged infringer had access to his or her song, and 
second, that both songs are substantially similar.24  Yet, even if the trier of fact 
decides that there was copying, the pieces must again be judged “substantially 
similar” before liability will ensue.  Herein lies the confusion.  Copying by itself is 
not copyright infringement.  In order to have an infringement, there must not only be 
copying, but also “substantial similarity” between defendant’s work and the original 
work at a level that the ordinary observer would recognize.25  What this means, in the 
context of the musical copyright infringement suit, is that some part of the 
defendant’s work has to be substantially similar to the plaintiff’s work to the ears of 
the ordinary lay listener.   
Substantial similarity is, absent actual evidence of real copying, therefore really 
required to prove copying; once, however, copying has been established, plaintiff 
must again show substantial similarity in order to prove there was an infringement.  
Obviously, “substantial similarity to show that the original work has been copied is 
not the same as substantial similarity to prove infringement . . . . While [a] rose is a 
rose is a rose is a rose,’ substantial similarity is not always substantial similarity.”26 
B.  Probative Similarity as Distinguished from Substantial Similarity 
Arguably, juries do not understand the difference between a test for substantial 
similarity which proves copying only and a second test for substantial similarity 
which indicates that too much was taken. It is apparent that the term “substantial 
similarity” has been employed too loosely in copyright infringement jurisprudence.  
In the first part of the bifurcated test, it refers just to the act of copying itself, i.e., the 
factfinder is seeking proof that defendant copied as a factual matter from plaintiff’s 
work based on the disputed songs’ similarities.27  The late Professor Alan Latman 
suggested calling similarity which is merely probative of copying probative 
                                                           
determined that George Harrison subconsciously plagiarized the old hit song “He’s So Fine” 
when he wrote “My Sweet Lord”). 
23See, e.g., Derrick D. Moore v. Columbia Pictures Indus. Inc., 972 F.2d 939 (8th Cir. 
1992) (copying can be established by a demonstration of access by the alleged infringer and 
substantial similarity between the disputed works); 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, 
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 13.01[B], at 13-11 (2004) (explaining that it is usually not possible 
to establish copying by direct evidence because it is rare that a plaintiff actually has a witness 
to the physical act of copying) [hereinafter NIMMER]. 
24“Of course, if there are no similarities, no amount of evidence of access will suffice to 
prove copying.  If there is evidence of access and similarities exist, then the trier of the facts 
must determine whether the similarities are sufficient to prove copying.”  Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 
468. 
25Id.; see also infra note 38. 
26Universal Athletic Sales Co. v. Salkeld, 511 F.2d 904, 907 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 
423 U.S. 863 (1975). 
27This is “copying as a factual matter.”  See NIMMER, supra note 23, at 13-13.  In and of 
itself, factual copying will not create liability in a defendant; there still must have been legally 
actionable copying. 
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similarity,”28 not “substantial similarity.”  That would alleviate the confusion. In the 
second step, after copying had already been demonstrated factually by establishing 
access and probative similarity, the issue of whether it was substantial enough to 
constitute impermissible copying becomes relevant.29  The term “substantial 
similarity” is properly employed in this latter context, to signify plaintiff’s final 
hurdle (s)he must overcome before (s)he recovers, i.e., that defendant’s copying, 
which we now know occurred, was also substantial enough to amount to an unlawful 
appropriation.30 
This second prong, the “substantial similarity” prong of the bifurcated copyright 
test, has been articulated in two ways by courts in the Second and Ninth Circuits, in 
the cases of Arnstein v. Porter31 and Sid & Marty Krofft Productions, Inc. v. 
McDonald’s Corporation.32 
C.  The Purview of Expert Analysis as Articulated by Arnstein 
1.  To Establish Probative Similarity (Factual Copying) Expert Testimony is 
Permitted. 
In Arnstein v. Porter, Ira Arnstein accused Cole Porter of plagiarizing several of 
his compositions.33  Arnstein’s theories of access were tenuous, even fantastic; still, 
                                                                
28“Substantial similarity,” while said to be required for indirect proof of copying, is 
actually required only after copying has been established to show that enough copying 
has taken place.  A similarity, which may or may not be substantial, is probative of 
copying if, by definition, it is one that under all the circumstances justifies an 
inference of copying.  In order to emphasize the function of such similarity and avoid 
the confusion of double usage, this Article suggests use of the term “probative 
similarity” in place of “substantial similarity” in this context. 
Alan Latman, “Probative Similarily” As Proof of Copying: Toward Dispelling Some Myths in 
Copyright Infringement, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1187, 1189-90 (1990). 
Professor Latman wisely counsels that, in the previous formulation, the term 
“substantial similarity” be discarded in favor of “probative similarity.”  In other 
words, when the question is copying as a factual matter, then similarities that, in the 
normal course of events, would not be expected to arise independently in the two 
works are probative of defendant’s having copied as a factual matter from plaintiff’s 
work.  Otherwise stated, such similarities negate defendant’s claim of independent 
creation. 
NIMMER, supra note 23, at 13-12, 13. 
29“In any event, however, copying as a legal proposition must still be established; hence, 
substantial similarity remains an indispensable element of plaintiff’s proof, even in cases . . . 
in which defendant does not contest factual copying.”  NIMMER, supra note 23, at 13-13. 
30“In a suit like this, plaintiff, to make out his or her case, must establish two separate 
facts:  (a) that the alleged infringer copied from plaintiff’s work, and (b) that, if copying is 
proved, it was so ‘material’ or ‘substantial’ as to constitute unlawful appropriation.”  See Heim 
v. Universal Pictures Co., 154 F.2d 480, 487 (2d Cir. 1946). 
31154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946). 
32562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977). 
33Plaintiff alleged that defendant’s  
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the judge would not grant Porter’s motion for summary judgment and dismiss 
Arnstein’s case solely on that basis.34  (The modern trend insists that a plaintiff must 
establish a theory of access that is not merely possible, but also reasonable.35) 
Assuming there was a reasonable possibility of access, expert testimony would 
be permitted to aid the court in deciding whether or not there was any copying; 
specifically, expert testimony is permitted to help the factfinder decide whether or 
not two works are probatively similar.36  At this juncture, visual exhibits are 
commonly prepared comparing the various musical elements (notes, chord changes, 
rhythmic values) of each song.37  If factual copying is established (access plus 
                                                           
“Begin the Beguine” is a plagiarism . . . that defendant’s “I Love You” is a plagiarism 
. . . [and] that defendant’s . . . “Night and Day” is a plagiarism . . . . He further alleged 
that defendant’s “You’d Be So Nice To Come Home To” is plagiarized . . . . He also 
alleged that defendant’s “Don’t Fence Me In” is a plagiarism.   
Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 467. 
34Although some of Arnstein’s pieces that he had accused Porter of plagiarizing had been 
published, i.e., were theoretically available to Porter, some had never been published nor 
publicly performed at all.  Arnstein concluded that Porter assigned “stooges” to live in his 
apartment to watch him; he said that Porter might even have had something to do with the 
burglaries which occurred in his apartment.  Id. 
Summary judgment was, then, proper if indubitably defendant did not have access to 
plaintiff’s compositions.  Plainly that presents an issue of fact . . . .  Although part of 
plaintiff’s testimony on deposition (as to “stooges” and the like) does seem “fantastic,” 
. . . yet plaintiff’s credibility, even as to those improbabilities, should be left to the jury 
. . . . We should not overlook the shrewd proverbial admonition that sometimes truth is 
stranger than fiction. 
Id. at 469 (footnote omitted). 
35See, e.g., Selle v. Gibb, 741 F.2d 896 (7th Cir. 1984) (holding that where plaintiff’s 
contention was that the two disputed pieces were so strikingly similar, i.e., so much alike, that 
even if there was no possibility of access whatsoever, the factfinder could infer access).  Here, 
the court granted defendant’s motion for J.N.O.V., though, opining that: 
although it has frequently been written that striking similarity alone can establish 
access, the decided cases suggest that this circumstance would be most unusual.  The 
plaintiff must always present sufficient evidence to support a reasonable possibility of 
access because the jury cannot draw an inference of access based upon speculation and 
conjecture alone. 
Id. at 901. See also Jorgensen v. Epic/Sony Records, 351 F.3d 46, 49 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding 
that a record company’s “bare corporate receipt” of a plaintiff’s work is insufficient proof of 
access). 
36“Where plaintiff relies on similarities to prove copying (as distinguished from improper 
appropriation) paper comparisons and the opinions of experts may aid the court.”  Arnstein, 
154 F.2d at 473, n.19. 
37According to Dr. Parson’s testimony, the first eight bars of each song (Theme A) 
have twenty-four of thirty-four notes in plaintiff’s composition and twenty-four of 
forty notes in defendants’ composition which are identical in pitch and symmetrical 
position.  Of thirty-five rhythmic impulses in plaintiff’s composition and forty in 
defendants’, thirty are identical.  In the last four bars of both songs (Theme B), 
fourteen notes in each are identical in pitch, and eleven of the fourteen rhythmic 
impulses are identical.  Both Theme A and Theme B appear in the same position in 
each song but with different intervening material. 
Selle, 741 F.2d at 899. 
9Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2004
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probative similarity), the factfinder then has to evaluate whether or not there was 
improper or illegal copying — whether, as Arnstein articulated it, there was an 
“improper appropriation.”38 
2.  To Establish Substantial Similarity (Improper Copying) Expert Testimony is Not 
Permitted. 
Expert testimony is not permitted to help the factfinder decide whether or not 
there has been improper copying, i.e., an improper appropriation.39  Instead, the 
method employed under Arnstein to evaluate whether or not an improper 
appropriation has occurred is the lay listener test.40  If an unlawful taking has 
occurred, the ordinary listener has to recognize the original in the copy. While expert 
testimony is not completely banned at this stage of the litigation, it is limited to 
“assist in determining the reactions of [the] lay [audience].”41 
The salient criterion of the lay listener test is whether, considering “what is 
pleasing to the ears of lay listeners, who comprise the audience for whom such 
popular music is composed, that defendant wrongfully appropriated something 
which belongs to the plaintiff.”42  Consequently, while a music expert may offer an 
opinion as to whether or not defendant copied in fact, i.e., whether there is probative 
similarity, it is the sole purview of the “reasonable prudent listener” to ultimately 
determine whether there is substantial similarity, namely, whether or not there has 
been a “wrongful appropriation.”43  The expert is never allowed to say that “the 
songs sound the same.”44 
                                                                
38The plaintiff’s legally protected interest is not, as such, his reputation as a musician 
but his interest in the potential financial returns from his compositions which derive 
from the lay public’s approbation of his efforts.  The question, therefore, is whether 
defendant took from plaintiff’s works so much of what is pleasing to the ears of lay 
listeners, who comprise the audience for whom such popular music is composed, that 
defendant wrongfully appropriated something which belongs to the plaintiff. 
Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 473. 
39See id. at 468. “If copying is established, then only does there arise the second issue, that 
of illicit copying (unlawful appropriation). On that issue (as noted more in detail below) the 
test is the response of the ordinary lay hearer; accordingly, on that issue, ‘dissection’ and 
expert testimony are irrelevant.”  Id. 
40At the trial, plaintiff may play, or cause to be played, the pieces in such manner that 
they may seem to a jury to be inexcusably alike, in terms of the way in which lay 
listeners of such music would be likely to react . . . . The impression made on the 
refined ears of musical experts or their views as to the musical excellence of plaintiff’s 
or defendant’s works are utterly immaterial on the issue of misappropriation . . . for 
the views of such persons are caviar to the general — and plaintiff’s and defendant’s 
compositions are not caviar. 
Id. at 473. 
41Id. “The plaintiff may call witnesses whose testimony may aid the jury in reaching its 
conclusion as to the responses of such audiences.”  Id. 
42Id.  
43See Raphael Metzger, Name That Tune:  A Proposal for an Intrinsic Test of Musical 
Plagiarism, 34 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 139, 163 (1987). 
44See supra note 39. 
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3.  Summary 
According to Arnstein, music experts are permitted, based on their objective 
analyses or dissections of the disputed songs, to testify as to the similarities between 
them, but this testimony is only permitted on the issue of copying; on the issue of 
improper appropriation, experts are only permitted to render opinions as to what they 
think the hypothetical lay listener who is a member of the intended audience group 
might perceive upon hearing the two songs.  What the experts themselves perceive 
with their “refined” ears is irrelevant.  After all, it was the lay public who bought the 
records and compact discs containing the song(s) at issue and for whom the music 
was originally composed.45 
D.  The Purview of Expert Analysis as Articulated by Krofft 
1.  A Different Dimension in the Copyright Infringement Suit: The Idea/Expression 
Dichotomy 
The prohibition of expert testimony on the ultimate issue of whether or not there 
has been a wrongful appropriation still exists.46  The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
in Sid & Marty Krofft Television Productions, Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., however, 
emphasized a different dimension in the test for infringement,47 one that has not been 
easily imported into the musical copyright infringement suit.48 
In Krofft, an advertising agency attempted to acquire the McDonald’s hamburger 
restaurant chain account.  The agency approached Sid & Marty Krofft Television 
Productions and expressed a strong interest in offering a proposal to McDonald’s 
based on plaintiffs’ very successful H.R. Pufnstuf series.49  The advertising agency 
ultimately decided not to formally involve Sid & Marty Krofft Television 
Productions, circumventing the “need to pay the Kroffts a fee for preparing artistic 
designs and engineering plans.”50  It was nevertheless awarded the McDonald’s 
account and at some point hired former employees of the Kroffts “to design and 
construct the costumes and sets for McDonaldland.”51  The agency also hired “the 
same voice expert who supplied all of the voices for the Pufnstuf characters to 
supply some of the voices for the McDonaldland characters.”52  The plaintiffs filed 
                                                                
45See supra note 38. 
46See, e.g., Michael Der Manuelian, Note, The Role of the Expert Witness in Music 
Copyright Infringement Cases, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 127 (1988); Universal Athletic Sales Co. 
v. Salkeld, 511 F.2d 904 (3d Cir. 1975) (vacating summary judgment in favor of plaintiff 
because the district court relied on dissection on the ultimate issue of infringement), cert. 
denied, 423 U.S. 863 (1975); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Bandai-America, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 125, 
139 (D.N.J. 1982) (holding that dissection was not allowed on the issue of wrongful 
appropriation). 
47562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977). 
48See infra note 73. 
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suit and alleged, inter alia, that the McDonaldland advertising campaign “infringed 
the . . . copyrighted articles of Pufnstuf merchandise.”53   
The first requirement in a copyright infringement suit is the ownership of a valid 
copyright.54 Copying, then, “is said to be shown by circumstantial evidence of access 
to the copyrighted work and substantial similarity between the copyrighted work and 
the defendant’s work.”55  More precisely, since this article has embraced the lexicon 
of Professor Latman, copying is established by circumstantial evidence of access, 
plus “probative similarity.”56 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals then put a new spin on the bifurcated 
copyright test. 
There must be ownership of the copyright and access to the copyrighted 
work.  But there also must be substantial similarity not only of the general 
ideas but of the expressions of those ideas as well. Thus two steps in the 
analytic process are implied by the requirement of substantial similarity.57 
2.  Comparing and Contrasting Krofft with Arnstein 
Arnstein and Krofft say the same thing in different ways. 
Under Arnstein, a plaintiff who was alleging an infringement was required to 
establish ownership of a valid copyright, copying (access plus probative similarity), 
and improper appropriation (substantial similarity). 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals did not claim to be making new law;58 Krofft 
merely equated its concept of infringing general ideas with Arnstein’s “copying” 
element and its concept of infringing the expression of those ideas with Arnstein’s 
“improper appropriation” element.  “[T]he protection granted to a copyrighted work 
extends only to the particular expression of the idea and never to the idea itself.”59  
There is an idea/expression dichotomy; where the line falls is “subtle and complex” 
and must be decided on a case-by-case basis.60 
The “copying” prong of Arnstein, access plus probative similarity, establishes 
whether or not the “idea” has been infringed, this by itself is not copyright 
                                                                
53Id. at 1162. 
54Id. “It has often been said that in order to establish copyright infringement a plaintiff 
must prove ownership of the copyright and ‘copying’ by the defendant.”  Id.  See also 
Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468. 
55See Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1162. 
56“[S]uch probative similarity need not be ‘substantial.’”  See LATMAN, supra note 18, at 
1188. 
57See Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1164. 
58Id. at 1165.“We believe that the court in Arnstein was alluding to the idea-expression 
dichotomy which we make explicit today.”  Id.  
59Id. at 1163. 
60Id. at 1164. 
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infringement.61  Consequently, Arnstein’s “copying” prong has a counterpart in 
Krofft, i.e., the copying of merely the idea, but not the expression. 
Under Krofft, expert testimony is only permitted to establish whether or not the 
idea has been copied.  
We shall call this the “extrinsic test.” It is extrinsic because it depends not 
on the responses of the trier of fact, but on specific criteria which can be 
listed and analyzed . . . [s]ince it is an extrinsic test, analytic dissection 
and expert testimony are appropriate. Moreover, this question may often 
be decided as a matter of law.62 
Under Arnstein, recall that expert dissection and analysis were permitted only to 
establish “probative similarity” between plaintiff’s and defendant’s works, assuming 
that there was a reasonable possibility of access. (Under Arnstein, expert testimony is 
not permitted to help the factfinder decide whether there was an unlawful 
appropriation; the “lay listener test” was employed there.) Under Krofft, similarly, 
expert testimony is not permitted to decide the ultimate issue of whether or not 
“expression” has been infringed; rather, “the test to be applied in determining 
whether there is substantial similarity in expressions shall be labeled an intrinsic one 
depending on the response of the ordinary reasonable person.”63  Practically, 
therefore, the musical expert’s testimonial role ends up being the same whether one 
litigates in New York or California. 
Despite their fundamental agreements, however, there remains some elusive, but 
practically insubstantial differences between the two cases. Arnstein never formally 
articulated the “idea/expression dichotomy.”  Further, “wrongful appropriation” and 
“infringement of expression” are not necessarily fungible terms. When an “idea” 
becomes an “expression” is arguably a qualitative distinction.  Arnstein, however, 
contemplated the distinction between copying in fact and wrongful appropriation as 
more of a quantitative64 one:  Assuming that there was copying, was enough taken to 
constitute a wrongful appropriation?65  This article supports the view that in musical 
infringement suits Krofft should be read in light of Arnstein. 
                                                                
61When the Arnstein court referred to “copying,” specifically, access plus probative 
similarity, it was referring to “the work’s idea, which is not protected by the copyright.”  Id. at 
1165. 
62Id. at 1164. 
63Id. 
64One commentator notes that “Arnstein did not contemplate this type of qualitative 
distinction between material copied and material improperly appropriated, as Krofft presumes.  
Rather, Arnstein’s distinction was one of the degree to which defendant copied plaintiff’s 
work.”  See Der Manuelian, supra note 46, at 138. 
65“The question, therefore, is whether defendant took from plaintiff’s works so much of 
what is pleasing to the ears of lay listeners, who comprise the audience from whom such 
popular music is composed, that defendant wrongfully appropriated something which belongs 
to the plaintiff.”  Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 473 (emphasis added). 
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E.  Applying Idea-Expression Analysis to the Musical Infringement Suit 
Judge Learned Hand admitted that there is no rule of thumb, no principle that can 
be put forth when an imitator, riding the abstract continuum between idea and 
expression, has “gone beyond copying the ‘idea’” and has now “borrowed its 
‘expression.’”66  “Decisions must therefore inevitably be ad hoc.”67  Substantial 
similarity of “ideas” will not itself constitute an infringement, but rather, only when 
the trier of fact decides that substantial similarity exists in the “expressions” of the 
ideas.68 
In music, when can it be said that an imitator has crossed the Rubicon, gone 
beyond copying the “idea,” and ventured into the land of borrowed “expression?”  
What constitutes a musical “idea?” The distinction is at times obvious. Common 
musical elements like chords and scales lie in the public domain and may be properly 
classified as “ideas.”  However, the real genius of a Beethoven, a Mozart, or a 
Stravinsky is the particular manner in which they extracted motifs from the chords 
and scales and then developed them.  That is “expression.” 
Let us now consider the concept of “musical copyright infringement” in terms of 
Krofft’s idea-expression continuum in order to illustrate how nebulous the concept is.  
Except in the patent cases to which Judge Frank referred,69 it is very difficult to 
ascertain exactly when copyright infringement does or does not occur. 
Suppose a songwriter hears a sad song on the radio. Surely, a sad song is an 
“idea;” no writer can monopolize the concept of a “sad song.”70  The second writer 
will not infringe upon the first’s by writing a sad one of her own.  What if the first is 
in the key of D minor? Still, a sad song in the key of D minor is only an “idea,” for 
surely nobody can possess a monopoly on the idea of a “sad song in the key of D 
minor.”  Assume, now, that the song has nothing but string quartet as musical 
accompaniment, and is sung by a male singer.  If some imitator felt inspired, upon 
listening to such a “sad song in D minor for male singer with string quartet” to 
compose one of her own, still who could stop her?  Furthermore, if the first 
composer based his leading melody on the D minor scale, so could the second for, in 
addition to everything else, no writer should be able to monopolize the D minor 
scale.71 
What, though, if the first composer executed some identifiable “twist” on the D 
minor scale as he developed his melody, and the imitator then copied that — is that 
now actionable?  The answer could only depend upon whether the imitator has 
                                                                
66See Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960). 
67Id. 
68See Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1164. 
69See supra text accompanying notes 11-12. 
70See, e.g., Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1164 (9th Cir. 1977) (analogous to the example of the 
cheaply manufactured plaster statue of a nude this case employed to demonstrate the outer 
limits of copyright protection). 
71See, e.g., Paul M. Grinvalsky, Idea-Expression in Musical Analysis and the Role of the 
Intended Audience in Music Copyright Infringement, 28 CAL. W. L. REV. 395, 400-01 & n.40 
(1992) (stating that the chords and musical notes themselves are in the public domain and 
cannot be copyrighted) [hereinafter Grinvalsky]. 
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somehow crossed our metaphorical line, has captured that ineffable, but 
recognizable, magical essence that truly defines the original author’s motif.  Perhaps 
for the first time we will allow plaintiff to whisper that the imitator has gone beyond 
copying merely the “idea” of a “sad song in D minor based on a D minor scale for 
male singer with string quartet accompaniment” and has now borrowed its 
“expression.”  Although we cannot say for sure when it happened, because the 
distinction between idea and expression is such an arbitrary one, if Judge Frank is 
right, in at least the most extreme cases we will know that it did not; those are Judge 
Frank’s patent cases. 
F.  Arnstein:  A Recapitulation 
The Krofft court admitted that it intended to maintain the same type of bifurcated 
test that was announced in Arnstein v. Porter,72 i.e., that expert analysis and 
dissection must not be permitted to aid the trier of fact in deciding whether or not 
“expression” has been borrowed.  Contemporary music copyright infringement 
cases, however, have generally ignored Krofft’s explication of the idea/expression 
dichotomy, preferring instead to rely on the basic tenets of Arnstein.73 
Arnstein is not perfect.  The “lay listener test” is lamentably flawed because a 
factfinder, whether judge or jury, may not be able to put itself in the shoes of the 
hypothetical person who is a member of the intended audience for whom that work 
was composed.74  As Judge Lay candidly admitted, concurring in part and dissenting 
in part in Derrick D. Moore v. Columbia Pictures, Industries, Inc.:  
I have played the tape which contains the two musical compositions and 
although I do not know the difference between be-bop, hip-hop, and rock 
and roll, the tunes all sound the same to me.  This may be because I have 
no ear for music other than reflecting my generation’s preference for the 
more soothing rhythms of Glen Miller and Wayne King or the 
sophisticated beat of Woody Herman playing the Wood Chopper’s Ball.75 
Furthermore, the “layhearer test” may result in infringement verdicts based on 
similarities which may not be due to copying at all, but to prior art or happenstance, 
and on the other hand, as Professor Nimmer has stated, under the “lay hearer test,” 
                                                                
72“This same type of bifurcated test was announced in Arnstein v. Porter.”  Krofft, 562 
F.2d at 1164. 
73“Recent music plagiarism cases have, for the most part, ignored Krofft’s introduction of 
the idea-expression dichotomy and adhered to the principles of Arnstein.”  Der Manuelian, 
supra note 46, at 139.  See, e.g., Benson v. The Coca-Cola Co., 795 F.2d 973 (11th Cir. 1986); 
Selle v. Gibb, 567 F. Supp. 1173 (N.D. Ill. 1983), aff’d, 741 F.2d 896 (7th Cir. 1984); Testa v. 
Janssen, 492 F. Supp. 198 (W.D. Pa. 1980).  But see Baxter v. MCA, Inc., 812 F.2d 421, 423 
(9th Cir. 1987) (following Krofft), cert. denied, Williams v. Baxter, 484 U.S. 954 (1987). 
74See, e.g., Debra Presti Brent, The Successful Musical Copyright Infringement Suit:  The 
Impossible Dream, 7 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 229, 247 (1990) (stating that the “lay 
listener test” is a far cry from the “reasonable man under the circumstances” standard used in 
negligence law that it purports to emulate).  “Because expert testimony is not allowed to lend 
guidance to the factfinder in making an informed response, the average lay listener standard is 
extremely difficult to apply.”  Id.    
75972 F.2d at 948 (Lay, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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“very real appropriation” may not be detected.76  Notwithstanding these criticisms, 
the “layhearer test” is arguably no more flawed than a normal negligence test. 
In stark contrast, the objective prong of Arnstein, which advocates the use of 
expert dissection and analysis of the musical elements of both parties’ songs in order 
to probe for concrete similarities between them, is steadfast. It is not subjective like a 
“layhearer test.”  Ah, this was the stuff of which Judge Frank’s “dike” was built; at 
the summary judgment stage, such “meat-and-potatoes” analysis seemed sure to keep 
the patent case out of court.  The musical expert compares lyrical and musical 
elements of two songs and renders an opinion for the benefit of the trier of fact 
whether or not they are probatively similar, i.e., whether one was copied from the 
other.  If the disputed pieces are not factually similar, the suit theoretically ought to 
be dismissed as a matter of law.  Whether or not such a case will be appropriately 
dismissed, however, may depend on whether the expert uses conventional or 
nonconventional analytical techniques.  The balance of this article evaluates the 
expert’s methodology. 
III.  CONVENTIONAL METHODS OF COMPARING TWO MUSICAL PIECES 
Musicologists compare musical pieces by first transposing them into the same 
key.  They then juxtapose salient accompaniment lines, harmonies, and melodic 
themes in order to identify which rhythms, chords, and notes occur simultaneously.77  
Such a comparison yields an opinion as to the degree of similarity between two 
musical pieces. 
A.  Preparation for Musical Analysis 
1.  Audition 
The expert is initially requested by the client, typically the client’s attorney, to 
audition two pieces of music in dispute and to offer an opinion as to whether or not 
they are similar.  Almost always this first involves a listening session, but can 
occasionally mean a direct examination of musical notation on manuscript paper.78  
During the initial listening session, an expert with “good ears” may notice chordal, 
structural, lyrical, or melodic similarities, assuming that they do exist.  The expert’s 
task is to objectively compare the musical elements of both pieces and to render a 
professional opinion as to whether or not there was any copying. In order to 
graphically demonstrate to the trier of fact a rational basis for his or her conclusion, 
the expert will ultimately commit the pieces of music to paper.  Such a process is 
called transcription. 
2.  Transcription 
Upon transcription, a prima facie analysis of four bars of two disputed 
compositions may yield the following results:  
                                                                
76See NIMMER, supra note 23, § 13.03[E][2], at 13-92. 
77The expert typically prepares elaborate charts for purposes of litigation.  These charts 
line up disputed musical elements and either serve to highlight or disparage the alleged 
similarities. 
78The expert is customarily provided with compact disc or digital (DAT) audio tapes for 
purposes of this analysis. 
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Notice that although certain rhythmic similarities are intentional and obvious, the 
notes themselves are not the same.  Notice, too, that the accompaniment chords are 
quite different.  In short, aside from the striking graphic similarities which identical 
rhythms have a tendency to produce on the printed page, there are melodic and 
harmonic similarities that exist between the two pieces which go unnoticed simply 
because they are in entirely different musical keys. Example 1, with two sharps, is in 
the key of D major; Example 2, with one flat, is in F major. For this reason, the 
expert will transpose both pieces into the same key, and that key is almost always C 
major. 





Notice how much more similar the two pieces are revealed to be once they are 
put in the same key.  Indeed, the melodic lines in measures two and four, 
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respectively, expose a sequence of notes which is exactly the same.  Melodic 
fragments in the second halves of the first measures, moreover, and in the first halves 
of the third measures, also reveal identity.  Numerous similarities in the harmonic 
accompaniment have now become obvious.  For all of these reasons, transposition is 
the launching pad for expert analysis.  The key musical elements in both pieces, 
particularly the melody, can be fairly compared in a generic musical key. 
B.  Substantive Musical Analysis and Comparison 
1.  Melody 
Melody is simply defined as that aspect of music having to do with the succession 
of pitches and rhythms.79  “A good melody generally remains within a reasonable 
compass, not straying too far from a central range.”80 
A musicologist compares melodies for similarities and differences in note 
sequence and rhythmic patterns.  As one musical expert has written, “If a large 
percentage of the same pitches are the same rhythmically, and occur in the same 
sequence, then I consider the melodies to be substantially similar.”81  The melodies 
of Examples 3 and 4, tested under this criterion, initially indicate probative 
similarity, or factual copying. 
2.  Harmony 
Harmony is defined as that aspect of music having to do with chords.82  A chord 
is a combination of several pitches of music played simultaneously; a “chord 
progression,” in turn, is a sequence of particular chords.  “The combination of two or 
more harmonic intervals makes a chord.”83  Some chord progressions are common 
and have the potential to support a seemingly infinite number of melodies.  For 
example, hundreds of tunes have been written to the I-VI-IV-V chord progression, 
i.e., a C major chord, followed by an A minor, followed by an F major, and 
culminating with a G major.84  Even more common is the basic I-IV-V chord 
progression which has provided the basis for blues and rock-n-roll, and taken more 
abstractly, has provided a basic theoretical harmonic map for all western music, even 
the classical symphony.85  The I chord is a home base, the IV chord departs into new 
territory like a proverbial prodigal son, and the V chord announces his inevitable 
return home again.  The existence of identical chord progressions, especially those 
                                                                
79JOSEPH KERMAN, LISTEN 549 (3D ED. 1980). 
80ARNOLD SCHOENBERG, FUNDAMENTALS OF MUSICAL COMPOSITION 16 (Gerald Strang & 
Leonard Stein eds., 1967). 
81Judith Greenberg Finell, Using an Expert Witness in a Music Copyright Case, 12 ENT. L. 
REP. 3 (1990) [hereinafter Finnell II]. 
82KERMAN, supra note 79, at 548. 
83WALTER PISTON, HARMONY 13 (5th ed. 1987). 
84See, e.g., Lorenz Hart & Richard Rodgers, Blue Moon (Robbins Music Corp. 1934); 
Hoagy Carmichael & Frank Loesser, Heart and Soul (Famous Music Corp. 1938). 
85“The I-IV-V progression has been the most widely used progression in western 
civilization.”  Grinvalsky, supra note 71, at 413. 
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banal ones most common to popular music, does not in and of itself indicate 
copying.  “With a strikingly similar melody, however, the same chord progression 
suggests possible plagiarism.”86  Consequently, while Examples 3 and 4, supra, do 
indicate that substantially the same chord progressions were employed by both 
plaintiff and defendant, that would be insufficient to establish factual copying if it 
were not also true that both progressions buttress substantially similar melodies. 
3.  Accompaniment, Orchestration, and Style 
Musical compositions are generally texturized or treated.  Accompaniment and 
orchestration refer to the musical treatment a composition receives.87  Style refers to 
a particular genre of music.  The presence of some or all three elements in both 
plaintiff’s and defendant’s musical compositions may further evidence copying if 
more substantive elements like melodic similarity, harmonic similarity, and lyrical 
similarity have already raised red flags in the eyes and ears of the expert.  Choices of 
accompaniment, orchestration, and stylistic treatment become salient whenever a 
musical hook, as so often happens, is the product of a unique sound or recording 
technique.  Historically, many signature guitar, synthesizer, and drum sounds have 
become married to the musical hooks they have introduced.88  Duplications of unique 
sounds, in plaintiff’s sound recording, like the unusual “noise” of the dribble of a 
basketball on a hardwood floor to emulate a kick drum, or the clamorous clanking of 
a garbage-can lid to simulate a snare, could be evidentially significant that there was 
factual copying of plaintiff’s musical composition because the sound recording in 
which plaintiff’s musical composition was embodied obviously inspired defendant. 
4.  Musical Structure or Form 
Structure or form has to do with the shape of a piece of music.89 
When music theory speaks of traditional forms, its reference is to 
established models of musical structure which were brought to 
consummate realization in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and 
which show remarkable viability today.  Most formal studies in musical 
                                                                
86Finell II, supra note 81, at 4. 
87Musical texture results from the synthesis of individual parts in a composition.  We 
describe a texture as having one or more elements (such as melody and 
accompaniment), as being in two or more parts, as homophonic, polyphonic, light, 
dense, complex, transparent, or other more or less precise attributes.  We may also 
speak of vocal or instrumental texture, or orchestral or keyboard texture, terms that 
reflect performance media. 
PISTON, supra note 83, at 284. 
88See, e.g., EMERSON, LAKE & PALMER, Lucky Man, on EMERSON, LAKE & PALMER 
(Victory Music Inc./Polygram Records 1970) (Keith Emerson’s synthesizer sound); DONNIE 
IRIS & THE CRUISERS, Ah! Leah!, on BACK ON THE STREETS (Carousel/MCA Records 1980) 
(“stacked” vocal chorus); PHIL COLLINS, In The Air Tonight, on FACE VALUE (Atlantic 
Records 1981) (bombastic, “gated” drum bursts).  This is not to say that it is copyright 
infringement to copy or emulate such sounds provided that the copier does not merely 
“sample” them.  See generally Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 383 F.3d 390 (6th 
Cir. 2004) (enunciating a different standard for infringement of sound recordings). 
89KERMAN, supra note 79, at 548, 552. 
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form have as their basis of subject matter the literatures which reflect the 
broad principles of these forms.90 
Classical symphonies are written in sonata-form, consisting of the exposition, the 
development, and the recapitulation.91  Music, like life, is born, grows and develops, 
and ultimately expires.  Popular music is not quite as profound, nor so complex.  
Nevertheless, there are strict forms employed in popular music.  Most popular songs 
of the 1930s and 1940s were written in “A-A-B-A” form.92  Many contemporary 
songs continue this tradition.93  The most popular song form, however, of the last 
twenty years has been a straight verse-chorus form, with a “middle eight” added for 
harmonic and melodic contrast.  Chart this form as “A-B-A-B-C-A-B.”  Quite often 
there is an additional sub-chorus included to set up the actual chorus (“A-B-A-B-C-
D”).  In pop parlance, the actual chorus is called the “hook” of the song, and must be 
something quite special.94  It is this “hook” which simultaneously grabs a radio-
listener’s ear, increases a general manager’s advertising revenue, brings a smile to 
the metaphysical countenance of the record company, and helps society to mark 
time. 
The use of identical musical structures or forms, like composing in a particular 
style or employing a specific orchestration technique, will not by itself indicate 
factual copying.  Considered along with circumstantial evidence of access and other 
indicia of copying, however, the use of a similar musical form, especially an unusual 
one, certainly would buttress a finding of factual copying.95 
C.  Prior Art, Tradition, and Standardized Musical Formulas 
Prior art refers to “earlier pieces of music with passages that are similar or 
identical to the relevant portions of the music at issue.”96  Prior art is important 
because if the relevant portions already existed in past musical compositions, the fact 
                                                                
90WALLACE BERRY, FORM IN MUSIC, at xiii (1966). 
91Id. at 173. 
92See, e.g., Hoagy Carmichael & Stuart Gorrell, Georgia on My Mind (Peer International 
Corp. 1930); Dorothy Fields & Jimmy McHugh, I’m in the Mood for Love (Famous Music Co. 
1935); Hoagy Carmichael & Mitchell Parish, Star Dust (Mills Music, Inc./Everbright Music 
Co. 1929). 
93See, e.g., THE BEATLES, Yesterday, on HELP! (Capitol Records 1965). 
94The repeated title section of the song is called the hook, the part of the song that 
grabs the listener’s attention and tends to remain in the mind after the song is over.  
The term hook can also refer to any memorable melodic figure, which, more often 
than not, contains the song’s title. 
SHEILA DAVIS, THE CRAFT OF LYRIC WRITING 31 (1985). 
95“In other words, when the question is copying as a factual matter, then similarities that, 
in the normal course of events, would not be expected to arise independently in the two works 
are probative of defendant’s having copied as a factual matter from plaintiff’s work.”  
NIMMER, supra note 23, § 13,01[B], at 13-12. 
96Finell II, supra note 81, at 4. 
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that they now turn up in both plaintiff’s and defendant’s musical pieces is not 
surprising and is not necessarily by itself indicative of copying.97 
Moreover, each genre of music, e.g., blues, rock, light pop, classical, and 
numerous ethnic styles such as polka, has particular characteristics, rhythm and 
instrumentation that make all works in that genre somewhat similar.  Indeed, certain 
practices over time develop a “gloss” which, analogous to legal precedent, become 
part of common musical parlance.98  Consequently, the fact that in both plaintiff’s 
and defendant’s musical compositions the guitarists may have played “Johnny B. 
Goode” type guitar introductions would not in and of itself indicate factual copying. 
In other words, there are standardized musical formulas and compositional 
devices which no one can appropriate, i.e., in Krofft terms, the musical “idea” as 






Please reconsider Examples 3 and 4.  While the melodies in the second measures 





                                                                
97“This policy balances an author’s interest against the competing interests of science and 
art, the need for society at large to build upon, and benefit from the use of, ideas.”  Grinvalsky, 
supra note 71, at 399 (footnote omitted). 
98Id. at 413.  “Countless examples exist . . . . each genre has particular characteristics, 
rhythm and instrumentation for example, that make them more similar to works within the 
genre than without.”  Id. at 414.  These are commonly called scenes a faire.  “A scenes a faire 
finding, unlike a finding of copyright validity, does not turn on whether plaintiff copied prior 
art.  Rather, the court examines whether ‘motive’ similarities that plaintiffs attribute to 
‘copying’ could actually be explained by the commonplace presence of the same or similar 
motives within the relevant field.”  See Smith v. Jackson, 84 F.3d 1213, 1219 (9th Cir. 1996). 
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Example 5 — ‘C’ major scale 
Plaintiff’s melody, therefore, is not distinctive, and (s)he will consequently need a 
great deal of corroborating evidence, e.g., there will have to be substantial lyrical and 
harmonic similarities between the disputed pieces, in addition, of course, to proof 
that defendant had prior access, in order to prevail. 
IV.  NONCONVENTIONAL METHODS OF COMPARING MUSICAL PIECES 
A.  Defining “Nonconventional” Methods 
Nonconventional methods of comparing musical pieces go beyond traditional 
approaches in attempting to uncover possible “disguised” plagiarism. 
If there is an obvious perceptible similarity between two pieces of music 
that is not reflected by simple comparative methods, then it is the 
obligation of the expert to go further to explain analytically why the 
pieces are perceived to be similar, rather than rigidly relying on a simple 
linear comparison that, in some situations, will conceal more than reveal.99 
The notion is that conventional methods of comparative musical analysis do not 
work when pieces of music somehow seem similar but have been deliberately 
disguised so as to avoid plagiarism claims.  For example, musicologist Judith 
Greenberg Finell has written that one method of disguise is to reposition or reverse 
related musical elements so that they have the same musical effect as in the original 
piece, but do not line up identically on manuscript paper. Consequently, they escape 
detection by conventional analysis.100 
For example, an original song may have a main melodic theme consisting 
of the scale positions 5-5-4-3-2 in a tango rhythm.  A purposefully 
disguised imitation may have its main theme, also in the same tango 
rhythm, as 2-2-3-4-5. Technically, these are opposites.  Yet the two pieces 
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Examples 6 and 7 
 
In other words, Ms. Finell would argue that although both motifs in Examples 6 
and 7 have a similar impact on the listener, as can readily be observed, they look 
different on paper. Consequently, the employment of “nonconventional” musical 
analysis, i.e., looking for reversed tonal orders, for deliberate transpositions, for 
deliberate augmentations or diminutions of time values, and techniques like them, 
ought to be deployed to uncover similarities where none may exist otherwise in order 
to detect the infringement, i.e., the “disguised” infringement. 
B.  A Critique 
1.  The Basic Argument Against Nonconventional Musical Analysis 
The implications of the assumptions underlying nonconventional musical 
analysis appear irrational, dangerous, and at times even ridiculous.  Reversed tonal 
order, for example, illustrated in Examples 6 and 7, is one of a battery of common 
composition techniques commonly taught in music conservatories; it is meant to be 
utilized in conjunction with other compositional devices like transposition, 
expansion, contraction, augmentation, diminution, fragment repetition, fragment 
subtraction, and changed tonal order by serious composers as a means to develop 
musical motifs in intellectual, time-tested ways.102  “True, it is the themes which 
catch the popular fancy, but their invention is not where musical genius lies, as is 
apparent in the work of all the great masters.”103  It is in the development of the tune 
where the composer’s true genius lies, and the serious music student learns how to 
develop by analyzing how the great masters employed such devices.104  Exploited for 
                                                                
102See WALTER PISTON, COUNTERPOINT 103-07 (1st ed. 1947), for a discussion of motive 
variation.  Professor Piston includes examples of diminution, augmentation, inversion and 
retrograde motion, i.e., reversed tonal order, transposition, and other rhythmic variations.  See 
also WILLIAM RUSSO ET AL., COMPOSING MUSIC 27-41 (1983), for a discussion of melodic 
transformation.  Mr. Russo includes examples and applications of transposition, retrograde 
motion, inversion, augmentation, diminution, fragment addition, and fragment subtraction. 
103Arnstein v. Edward B. Marks Music Corp., 82 F.2d 275, 277 (2d Cir. 1936). 
104While it is impossible to list all techniques used in the development of musical themes 
and motives because they are limited only by a composer’s imagination, there have always 
been “tried and true” techniques employed either consciously (as in the case of Beethoven) or 
subconsciously (as in the case of Lennon & McCartney) by composers to effectively develop 
melody. 
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the purposes of highlighting similarities between disparate pieces of music instead, 
the composition techniques are misapplied.  This article argues that no two pieces of 
music composed by different composers could pass muster under the 
nonconventional musical analyst’s lens105 and, as this article will show, misapplying 
classical composition techniques in this fashion crudely destroys the dike that Judge 
Frank declared to exist at the summary judgment stage, transforming it into a sieve; a 
jury trial or an extorted settlement will be the inevitable result of every plagiarism 
suit. 
2.  Understanding Classical Composition Techniques 
A motif (or motive) is a short fragment of melody or rhythm which is used to 
construct a long section of music.106  Schoenberg referred to the basic motif as the 
“germ” of a melodic idea.107  Development is the process of expanding a motif into 
larger sections of music.108 “Everything depends on its treatment and 
development.”109  What follows is a list of basic composition techniques that have 
been employed by composers for several centuries to develop motifs.110 
The original idea is based on a C 6th chord. 
 
 
                                                           
The process of . . . thematic change is called development, a principal resource in the 
so-called organic or narrative musical forms, especially the sonata and rondo forms.  
Symphonic melodies may be repeated in toto without essential change but in a variety 
of keys, as in the ritornello forms of the Baroque; or they may be used in every kind of 
contrapuntal combination and transposition, with or without motivic fragmentation, as 
in fugal technique.  Or they may be fragmented and the fragments repeated with 
seemingly endless variety, as in Beethoven’s technique . . . they may be continued and 
extended with new phrases, as in Mozart’s; they may be transformed rhythmically and 
metrically into new and independent guises, as in Liszt’s.  In the sonatas and 
symphonies of Viennese Classicism and nineteenth-century Romanticism, themes 
become the protagonists in a narrative succession of events; what they are becomes 
less important than what happens to them.   
PISTON, supra note 83, at 94. 
105Consider, for example, that the principal motif of The Theme From “Star Wars,” 
written by John Williams and published in 1977, happens to be the mirror melodic image of 
Born Free.  When analyzed side by side, these two melodies represent a classic application of 
the transformational technique of inversion.  Born Free, written by Don Black & John Barry, 
was published eleven years earlier in 1966.  I am not suggesting that John Williams 
deliberately inverted the melody of Born Free; to the contrary, I point to the absurd results that 
“nonconventional” musical analysis produces. 
106KERMAN, supra note 79, at 549-50. 
107SCHOENBERG, supra note 80, at 8. “Since it includes elements, at least, of every 
subsequent musical figure, one could consider it the ‘smallest common multiple’.  And since it 




110These are specific examples of the techniques discussed supra note 102. 
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Example 8 
 
Transposition — repeating the idea on a different scale degree.  
Example 9 — 3rd lower 
 
Example 10 — 4th higher 
 
Example 11 — A 2nd higher 
 
Expansion — expanding the idea by using larger intervals. 
Example 12 — original idea, then expanded 
 
Contraction — the idea is brought closer together by making the interval distance 
smaller. 
Example 13 — original idea, then contracted 
 
Augmentation — the time value of each tone is lengthened (often doubled). 
Example 14 — original idea with augmentation 
 
Diminution — the time value of each note is shortened. 
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Example 15 — original idea with diminution 
 
Fragment repetition — the idea is enlarged by the repetition of one or more of its 
basic members or fragments. 
Example 16 — original idea 
 
Example 17 — use of fragment repetition 
 
Fragment subtraction — omitting one or more fragments of the idea. 
Example 18 
 
Changed tonal order — the original tonal order is staggered or changed. 
Example 19 — original idea 
 
Example 20 — with changed tonal order 
 





2004-05] CLEVER MUSICAL TRICKS TO DIVIDE THE WEALTH 365 
Example 21 — original idea 
 
Example 22 — with reversed tonal order 
 
3.  Mozart’s Sonata in C Major 
The following twelve-bar excerpt from Mozart’s Sonata in C major (right-hand 
only) displays these techniques as they were applied by a genius. 
Example 23 
 
The salient motif, Mozart’s theme, can be found in measures one and two.  
Notice that it is developed further by techniques of transposition and expansion in 
measures three and four.  In measure five, Mozart begins an obvious developmental 
section, choosing to make the leading pivotal tone of each successive measure a note 
of the C scale. 
Example 24 — C scale 
 
Mozart is using this downward progression of the C scale in order to lead us back 
to the V chord in measure twelve, which in turn leads us inevitably back home to the 
I chord.  He then embellishes what would otherwise be a merely prosaic progression 
with an elaborate sequence of scale-based phrases, which he develops further by 
blatant use of transposition in measures six, seven, eight, nine, and ten. 
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Compare these with the notes Mozart chooses for his motif in measure one. 
Example 26 
 
It ought to be observed that reversed tonal order has been employed here. Mozart 
has exposed his motif to us in measure one, and in measure eleven has repeated it — 
but this time backwards! 
The conventional techniques that Mozart utilized are the building blocks of 
creativity that have animated Bach, Beethoven, and the balance of western music.  It 
is important to realize that “nonconventional” methodology also applies them, but 
inappropriately, i.e., not as a means to develop melodies, but rather, as a fatally 
flawed method to “detect” infringement. 
C.  Applying Nonconventional Musical Analysis to  
the Hypothetical Case: Ball v. Ravel 
It is difficult for plaintiffs to win copyright infringement suits; it is also expensive 
for defendants to litigate them.  Consequently, a defendant who refuses to settle on 
principle may find ultimate victory to be a Pyrrhic one. 
As long as there is a material dispute whether or not the two songs at issue are 
substantially similar, a defendant cannot hope to win a motion for summary 
judgment.  “The avowed purpose of those who sponsored the summary judgment 
practice was to eliminate needless trials where by affidavits it could be shown 
beyond possible question that the facts were not actually in dispute.”111 
Let us now return to Judge Frank’s famous dictum:  the patent case of 
noninfringement. “Nontraditional” analytical techniques take that patent case and 
obscure it, crudely and naively destroying Arnstein’s substance and meaning.  Judge 
Frank in Arnstein v. Porter stated that although Cole Porter could not be granted 
judgment as a matter of law on the grounds that his and Mr. Arnstein’s songs were 
not substantially similar, that did not mean that a case could never arise in which the 
absence of similarities was so obvious.  
We should not be taken as saying that a plagiarism case can never arise in 
which absence of similarities is so patent that a summary judgment for 
defendant would be correct.  Thus suppose that Ravel’s “Bolero” or 
                                                                
111Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 474. 
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Shostakovitch’s “Fifth Symphony” were alleged to infringe “When Irish 
Eyes Are Smiling.”  But this is not such a case.112 
Let us assume, however, that there is such a case and let us see what happens to it 
under the lens of “disguised” infringement analysis.  Mr. Ernest R. Ball, composer of 
“When Irish Eyes Are Smiling,” hypothetically sues Maurice Ravel for copyright 
infringement. Mr. Ball claims that “Bolero” has been deliberately disguised so as to 
avoid a plagiarism claim and his expert employs “nonconventional” methods of 
musical analysis in the response to M. Ravel’s motion for summary judgment.  
Example 27 — “When Irish Eyes Are Smiling”113 
 
Example 28 — “Bolero”114 
 
Notice that in the first four measurers of plaintiff’s song, a C major triad has been 
outlined; the fifth of the scale is employed in measures one and four (a G note), the 
third in measure two (an E note), and the tonic in measure three (a C note). 
Example 29 — A C major triad 
 
Defendant’s piece, “Bolero,” also “coincidentally” employs the device of chordal 
outline.  Measure one articulates the tonic, weaves towards the fifth of the scale in 
measure three, and settles on the third (an E note) in measures three and six. 




                                                                
112Id. at 473. 
113Ernest R. Ball, Chauncey Olcott, & Geo. Graff, Jr., When Irish Eyes Are Smiling (M. 
Witmark & Sons 1912). 
114Maurice Ravel, Bolero (Durand & Cie/United Music Publishers/Elkan-Vogel Co. 
1929). 
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Example 30 
 
The exact same sequence of notes that appears in measure five of “Bolero” also 
appears in measures eight and nine of plaintiff’s tune — a G note, followed by A and 
B. 
Observe the motif, an altercation between a C note and a B note, in measures ten 
and eleven of plaintiff’s song. 
Example 32 
 
Notice how this germ of a motif has been “appropriated” by the defendant 
throughout “Bolero;” it has, indeed, become the “heart” of M. Ravel’s piece.  M. 
Ravel, however, has cleverly disguised his “infringement” by employing a battery of 
composition techniques to cover his tracks.  The spirit of Mr. Ball’s tune, 
nevertheless, remains; its evocative feeling has been “captured” and is obvious to a 
trained expert. 
Defendant’s “Bolero” also centers around an altercation between the C and B 
notes, exposed in measure one. 
Example 33 — measure one of “Bolero” 
 
This motif, a nonconventional musical analyst would allege, has been directly 
lifted from “When Irish Eyes Are Smiling,” but “cleverly” altered by transposition 
and fragment repetition to avoid detection by conventional analysis. 
Observe the composition techniques of transposition and fragment repetition 
“working its magic” on Mr. Ball’s original motif in measure two of “Bolero.” 
Example 34 — measure two of “Bolero” 
 
Notice that M. Ravel has taken Mr. Ball’s melodic C to B altercation, has 
fragmented it, and has “transformed” it into a C to A altercation. 
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Consider, furthermore, measure six of defendant’s piece. 
Example 35 — measure six of “Bolero” 
 
Notice that by skillful use of diminution, M. Ravel has disguised the fact that he 
had directly lifted measures two and three of plaintiff’s tune. 
Example 36 — measures two and three of “When Irish Eyes Are Smiling” 
 
Observe that the exact same note sequence has been employed — an E followed 
by a D, then C.  Time values, however, have been deliberately truncated by M. 
Ravel, if one were to believe the nonconventional theorists, in order to avoid a 
charge of blatant infringement. 
To be sure, conventional musical analysis would not support factual copying in 
this case.  The song, “When Irish Eyes Are Smiling,” has been, of course, a hugely 
popular one.  It lived on the lips and in the hearts of American men and women 
during World War I and survived into the roaring twenties.  Maurice Ravel had 
access to it, was aware of it, and may have admired its popular success and folksy 
charm.  If one were to swallow the nonconventional musical analyst’s line, either he 
deliberately intended to musically meld a more serious work with the whimsy of Mr. 
Ball’s song, or, conceding the ubiquitous nature of plaintiff’s copyright, 
subconsciously plagiarized it.  Either way, Mr. Ball’s attorney might conclude in his 
brief in opposition to M. Ravel’s motion for summary judgment, there is no doubt 
that “When Irish Eyes Are Smiling” was singing in M. Ravel’s head when he 
composed his “Bolero.”  The musical similarities between the two pieces are obvious 
when “nonconventional” analytical techniques are employed to detect them.  They 
are even both in three-quarter time!  Defendant’s motion for summary judgment 
must therefore be denied; the lay listener, upon reviewing the evidence, will have to 
make the proper determination.  
V.  CONCLUSION 
Absurdly, by abusing conventional composition techniques a musicologist could 
convince a judge that Ravel’s “Bolero” came from “When Irish Eyes Are Smiling” 
or that Beethoven’s “Fifth Symphony” was derived from “Play That Funky Music, 
White Boy.”  To insult Judge Frank’s prudently qualified opinion is to give carte 
blanche to every musical terrorist who dares to file a complaint.  “Nonconventional” 
musical analysis is, after all, a boon for plaintiffs, their contingency-fee lawyers who 
game the system, and the musicologists who are hired to construct these musical 
mirages for them; it is not the right approach, though, for discovering truth or 
achieving justice.  It is not fair that legitimate professionals work hard at a 
respectable craft and under the American system are forced to finance frivolous 
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lawsuits by every Tom, Dick, or Hillary who believes, for whatever reason, that 
some great work of genius that (s)he whistled in the shower has been plagiarized by 
the likes of a Cole Porter or even a Barry Gibb.  Society must look for ways to curb 
and restrict spurious litigation. Lending credibility to “nonconventional” musical 
analysis and “disguised” infringement claims will have the opposite effect.  
Musicologists must have something better to do with their time; courts surely do.  
The author gratefully acknowledges Professor Michael H. Davis, 
Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland State University, for his 
assistance and advice respecting an earlier version of this article which 
won a national prize in ASCAP’s Nathan Burkan Memorial Competition, 
first prize at Cleveland State University, Cleveland-Marshall College of 
Law.  
This article is dedicated to Billy Joel, Lionel Richie, the Gibb Brothers, John 
Fogerty, and many others, but especially Cole Porter.  
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